ISLAMABAD: India and Pakistan should demonstrate responsible stewardship of their nuclear capabilities and New Delhi, in particular, should adopt and implement strengthened export controls.

In the absence of some "new" nuclear understandings, Pakistan and India are likely to enlarge their stocks of fissile material and expand their nuclear arsenals and delivery capabilities which will increase the already dangerous proliferation risks in South Asia as well as the chances for leakage from the region, of sensitive nuclear technology and material.

These were the findings and recommendations made to the US policy makers in the chairmen’s report of an Independent Task Force co-sponsored by the US Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society.

The report further said that it is unrealistic to believe that either India or Pakistan will give up this capability or that any conceivable external pressure will be sufficient to convince them to alter their positions. However, the US government needs to think much more searchingly about possible ways to fit India and Pakistan into the global non-proliferation system.

To-date, the Bush administration has not tackled the thorny problem of trying to find a place for India and Pakistan in the international nuclear system. The basic bargain of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - NPT, was that states willing to forego the development of nuclear weapons would be eligible to receive peaceful nuclear cooperation, commerce, and technology and the nations refusing to give up the weapons option would be ineligible for nuclear assistance and trade.

The NPT does not allow for recognition of "new" nuclear weapon states, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 1978 (NNPA) precludes US nuclear cooperation or commerce with countries, like India, that have not accepted International Atomic Agency safeguards on all their nuclear facilities (so-called full scope safeguards).

The NPT system has become virtually universal, only India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea- since it withdrew from the treaty earlier in 2003, are non-parties to the treaty. Because India and Pakistan both exploded nuclear devices after the January 1, 1968, cut-off date, they are in any case no longer eligible to join the treaty (even in the unlikely event that they chose to do so) unless they destroy their weapons as South Africa did.

In acquiring nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s goal was to match the capability that India had demonstrated in 1974 and to provide a deterrent against its neighbour’s conventional military superiority. Possession of nuclear weapons has taken the edge off India’s conventional arms advantage by raising the stakes any time New Delhi considers military action against Islamabad.